Alcorn, M. Jr. Narcissism and the Literary Libido: Rhetoric, Text, and Subjectivity. New York: NYU P, 1994.

(buy at Amazon)
 

SIX
 

LANGUAGE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SELF: A LACANIAN PERSPECTIVE
 

190
 

…Lacan…preeminent theorist of relationships between discourse and the subject.
 

As a practicing analyst, Lacan sought to understand the human subject. As a poststructuralist, he sought to understand the subject’s constitution through and by discourse.
 

192
 

Structuralists and poststructuralists tend to ignore the specific discourse functions (described by psychoanalysts) that, lying within the subject-system, operate on language. Psychoanalysts tend to ignore the discourse systems (described by structuralists) that, lying outside the domain of the subject, compose and situate the subjects.
 

…Frederic Jameson … Lacan’s work, with its emphasis on the “constitution of the subject,” displaces the problematic of orthodox Freudianism from models of unconscious processes or blockages toward an account of the formation of the subject and its constitutive illusions… Lacanian theory, with its decentering of the ego, the conscious subject of activity, the personality, or the “subject” of the Cartesian cogito… and its repudiation of the various ideals of the unification of the personality or the mythic conquest of personal identity… naïve, commons-sense categories of “character,” Protagonist,” or “hero,” … identification, sympathy, or empathy.
 

193
 

Lacan’s rejection and displacement of Freudian ideas is, to a large extent, something Jameson imagines.
 

… Bannet… There is in Lacan no autonomous, self-conscious subject in whom, as in a container, knowledge, experience and emotion inhere, whose relationship to the social environment can be measured in terms of reactivity and self-recognition. Lacan’s model for man is the computer. Man is a machine whose predetermined linguistically programmed circuits are governed by binary structures: closed-open, absent-present, 01.
 

If one reads Lacan hastily and uses quotations selectively, it is easy to find support for such claims.
 

194
 

Lacan …That is where the power revealed by the originality of the machines we have at our disposal falls short. There is a third dimension of time which they undeniably are no party to which I’m trying to get you to picture via this element which is neither belatedness, nor being in advance, but haste, the relation to time peculiar to the human being. That is where speech is to be found, and where language, which has all the time in the world, is not. That is why, furthermore, one gets nowhere with language.
 

Speech, something produced by humans, is very different from language. “the question of meaning” Lacan points out in an earlier context, “comes with speech.”
 

Meaning is produced as language is driven or operated by subject-functions such as desire, temporality, repression, the Imaginary.
 

195
 

In effect, Lefebvre-Pontalis points out that you can do “anything with language,” but only if there are speaking subjects. Lacan agrees, but adds: “Of course, the question is to know what the function of speaking subject is in all this.” For both Lacan and his commentators, the key question is to know “the function of the speaking subject.”
 

197
 

… “identity” pattern in poststructuralist thought that works to erase the human subject, to make “the subject of discourse” an entity composed, contained, derived from, and imprisoned by language (not speech). In The Pursuit of Signs, Jonathan Culler repeats claims made earlier by Levi-Strauss and argues that as structuralism investigates the self, it erases it: These disciplines find, as their work advances, that the self is dissolved as its various functions are ascribed to impersonal systems which operate through it as the self is broken down into component systems, deprived of its status as source and master of meaning, it comes to seem more and more like a construct”: a result of systems of convention. The subject conceived by structuralism is an “effect” of discourse. It is an illusion produced by linguistic effects.
 

198
 

In Book II Lacan insists that the subject is not an “entity,” and later that the “subject is no one.”
 

Lacan is not saying that there is no subject; he is instead disputing the kinds of boundaries place on the subject by traditional psychoanalytic theory.
 

Because the characteristic gesture of structuralism is to see the subject in terms of language, the subject easily becomes nothing but language.
 

For Lacan, relations between discourse and the subject are two-sided. The subject operates on discourse, and discourse operates the subjects. This dialogical interaction between subject-functions shaping discourse, and social forces providing the matrix of discourse…
 

199
 

In many ways Lacan’s account of the subject is a very precise account of meaning effects produced by the “impersonal” subject-functions and subject-components alluded to by Culler..
 

…the ego, can no longer aspire to control self-components and functions.
 

…human nature is not determined by a universal “inner nature” but by historical, social, and linguistic forces.
 

Lacan’s subject is perhaps best defined as the one who suffers.
 

200
 

Lacan’s subject is “de-centered,” but this de-centered subject is the focus for his theoretical project.
 

201
 

Paul Smith… critiqued the poststructuralist account of the subject in terms of its failure to explain resistance.
 

…subject…Althusser… simple effect of ideology, a unified structure “called” into place by the interpellating force of language…
 

202
 

…Lacan’s ideas in insisting that social discourse does not affect the subject in an immediate way. Social discourse is always mediated through unconscious structures.
 

Lacan’s subject…is characterized by conflict, has no “inner” unity, and has a porous “boundary.” The Lacanian Other, in part a discourse structure, is always at the conflictual core of the subject. Lacan’s subject thus is always most “outside” when it is most “inside.” …an alien discourse structure at the center
 

…the subject (as a discourse system) is very loosely “centered” around certain self-defining discourse patterns…
 

203
 

This absolute particularity of the subject’s language is in part related to what rhetoricians call “style” or “voice.” Subjects both appropriate and express discourse in their own unique way. More importantly for Lacan, this stylistic particularity of speech is related to various psychoanalytic phenomena—desire, repetition, resistance, trauma, and the symptom—that uniquely define and situate each subject.
 
 

207
 

Lacan teaches that the subject is a unique, though self-divided, system differing in important respects from other discourse systems that situate, constitute, and intervene in it. In this respect Lacan is not a poststructuralist.
 

…the Lacanian subject contains unique subject-driven mechanisms that both produce and feed on social discourse in quite unique and particular ways. Lacan describes the subject as a system whose discourse inside is formed from taking in material from an outside field of discourse. This system (the subject) has a porous boundary…
 

208
 

The particular organization of discourse within the subject produces the subject’s uniqueness.
 

The discourse systems “contained” by Lacan’s subject are “contained” by a biological body, thus contradictions between differing contained discourse subsystems have especially significant effects.
 

209
 

Often, in fact, political resistance is hard to distinguish from analytic resistance. But when subjects are successfully engaged in political resistance, the “containment” of suffering maps out a course of thought and action that provides a real solution to human suffering. Harmful sources of power are contained by successful political action. Psychoanalysis, like political action, can of course also provide an effective containment of suffering (a real solution to human suffering). The resistance to psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is a form of negative containment. When subjects in analysis are unwilling to face the truth of their own subjectivity, containment maps out a course of thought and action that has negative effects. Containment becomes a strategy of repression and thus less a satisfactory solution to a problem of suffering and more a source of suffering resulting from the repression of conflictual knowledge. This rather complex relationship between political resistance/containment and psychoanalytic resistance/containment has implications for understanding ideology.
 

210
 

If ideologies do not exclude certain packages of knowledge and prescribe certain modes of suffering as desirable “containments” for conflict, they fail to control the ruptures within self-structure and thus fail to provide directives for social organization.
 

Discourse can be present in memory as a rather free-floating and consequential thing. This discourse “package” does not affect other discourse contents within the self-system; it is simply a unit of memory. In this context, discourse plays no role in the constitution of the self; discourse is simply heard speech that may suffer any number of fates. It may be remembered longer, or it may be forgotten. In being forgotten, however, it is not repressed; it is simply something no longer available for conscious consideration and has no apparent effect on the subject. When discourse has the most important effects on the subject, it is not simply something remembered longer; it is something that works to organize or structure subject-components.
 

211
 

Lacan describes the ego as a system that contains “a whole organization of certainties, beliefs, of coordinates, of references.” The ego thus contains, in various ways and in various “packages,” knowledge. This object called knowledge, however, exists in many different states.
 

The particular content of these components is always already determined before the birth of the subject. The subject can do nothing other than largely internalize, and thus in some manner be, some particular manifestation of this discourse system.